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2Summary
The coronavirus health crisis is now a full-blown economic crisis, and one that may last 
for much more than a few months. Firms will go bust and unemployment will rise. The 
majority of this economic damage will be driven not by the direct impact of coronavirus 
itself, but by the necessary measures – such as social distancing – that we put in place to 
respond to it. 
Lower earners are likely to be hit most swiftly, in stark contrast to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Sectors already heavily affected have typical weekly pay of £320, compared to £455 for 
the economy as a whole. These include retail (excluding food), hotels and restaurants, 
airlines, travel operators, cleaning, arts and entertainment, and personal services like 
hairdressing, comprising 5 million employees and 1.2 million self-employed people. 2 
million of the lowest earners also lack entitlement to sick pay. Less than one-in-ten of 
those in the bottom half of earners say they can work from home, making it much harder 
for them to protect their incomes in the face of social distancing measures. Those in the 
most at-risk sectors and occupations also have less to fall back on, being around 25 per 
cent more likely than average to live in families with no savings at all.
This is the backdrop to an urgent need for the Government to step up its economic 
response. In recent days, the Chancellor has set out additional measures to those 
announced in the Budget, with a continued focus on subsidised loans and direct cash 
payments to firms. These are very welcome and important measures to reduce the 
permanent economic damage from what is now clearly a major economic shock. But 
much bolder steps to support family incomes are needed, as the Chancellor himself has 
set out. That is crucial not only to avoid hardship, but to reduce the depth of the crisis by 
reassuring families that they will not suffer deep and long-lasting hits to their income. 
We propose a broad and radical approach in three areas: relatively simple extensions of 
sick pay itself, much bolder moves to aid the retention of workers by struggling firms, and 
a stronger social security safety net.
On Statutory Sick Pay (SSP), the Government should extend it to the 2 million employees 
who earn less than £118 per week (£120 from April) and are ineligible. This would cost 
around £200 million. The Government could go further and make SSP more generous, 
but only if it met the costs of that increase, for small and medium-sized firms at least. 
Increasing SSP from £95.85 to £160 per week would ensure it covered half the earnings 
of employees that rely on it, up from the current third, and cost a further £800 million for 
small and medium-sized firms. 
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of the economic damage the country faces. The response needs to swiftly reduce 
struggling firms’ wage costs while simultaneously offering families reassurance that they 
will not face a long-lasting huge income hit. Both objectives are best achieved in tandem, 
via the introduction of a new Statutory Retention Pay (SRP) scheme in which people who 
don’t have work to do stay formally employed by their firm, but with a significant amount 
of their pay covered by the state. This must be delivered by exploiting mechanisms 
that are already in place to ensure it can be done swiftly, with Statutory Maternity Pay 
(SMP) providing the model. Firms would continue to pay workers at least two-thirds of 
their previous wages via their payroll (above the SMP minimum of £151 per week), with 
the state providing a rebate for those payments at a cost of £4 billion for an initial six 
months if 500,000 employees were involved, and £8 billion if a million were. Firms that are 
in a position to do so would top up SRP to nearer 100 per cent of the previous wage. A 
simpler flat-rate payment of £151 per week would cost £3.6 billion if 1 million workers were 
involved. 
Introducing such a scheme would not be straightforward, but is the best option within 
existing structures. Workers would still be paid when and how they are used to being 
paid. Established payment mechanisms would be used, which is significantly preferable 
in terms of operation and targeting to proposals being made, particularly in the US or 
among long-standing universal basic income advocates, to send flat-rate payments to all 
households. Given the benefits of maintaining existing links between firms and workers, 
preventing lasting rises in unemployment and reducing firm costs swiftly, making such a 
scheme a reality is not only highly desirable but urgent.
But even with such bold action, unemployment will rise. Some firms will go bust and work 
will dry up for many of Britain’s 5 million self-employed people. To protect those families 
affected from hardship, and strengthen the automatic stabilisers that support demand 
in the economy, we therefore also need to strengthen the social safety net. The usual 
arguments against doing so rest on the idea that it will discourage work, but that is of no 
relevance during a crisis of this sort. We do not start from a position of strength. Recent 
years of working-age benefit freezes have left the main rate of unemployment benefit 
lower in real terms than in the early 1990s, despite the economy growing by more than 75 
per cent in that period.
To address this, the main adult rate of out-of-work support in Universal Credit (UC) and 
other benefits should rise by one-third, to £100 per week, with equivalent increases in 
young-adult and couple rates. This would cost £10 billion over a year. The Government 
could go further and target a 10 per cent uprating of other elements of the means-tested 
benefit system (UC and tax credits), which would bring the total cost to £13 billion. 
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this crisis. As was the case before 2012, tax credits must be allowed to increase as 
workers’ incomes fall, so that they can play the crucial role of cushioning income shocks 
for those with fewer hours. Advance payments in Universal Credit should be as automatic 
as possible, with these loans not recouped during the next six months at least. Jobcentre 
Plus will need significant new resources to cope with big rises in claimant numbers, 
and the conditionality and sanctions regime suitable for normal times has no place in a 
recession.
Taken together, this three-part package would amount to a bold response to a very 
serious economic crisis. It would target the core problems that the nature of this shock 
is posing to individual firms, families and the economy as a whole. And crucially, it rests 
on measures that are not always easy but which can actually be taken, and taken swiftly. 
Now is the time to act.
Introduction
It has been clear for some time that the UK is facing a major health emergency, but it is 
now equally clear that we are heading for a deep economic shock. Recognition of this 
fact means that there is widespread agreement that much more needs to be done in 
response. 
The crucial question is what exactly can and should be done. The answer is a lot, with the 
intensification of measures to reduce the spread of coronavirus in fact meaning we need 
an intensification of the economic policy response.
Concrete and comprehensive recommendations for how that intensification should 
be delivered are the focus of this paper. We argue that given the scale of the shock, its 
nature and who is most likely to bear its impact, we now need a new approach.
Understanding the nature of the economic shock is crucial to 
responding to it
The approach the government should take in responding to this crisis, like any economic 
shock, must be based on a clear view about the nature of the shock. While some policy 
measures are of some use in almost all crises (like lower interest rates), all crises also 
involve bespoke responses that reflect their specific causes and the situation of the 
country experiencing them. 
A few weeks ago, the dominant view was that the main economic impact of this crisis 
was the temporary absence of sick workers alongside disruption to sales and supply 
chains. On the basis of that diagnosis, the Government has focused to date on two 
Doing what it takes | Protecting firms and families from the economic impact of coronavirus
Resolution Foundation
5responses in its Budget measures and the subsequent statement by the Chancellor on 
17 March. First, temporary support, largely via cheap loans and tax deferrals, for firms to 
prevent them going under (which would turn a temporary supply shock into a permanent 
hit). And second, economy-wide demand support from Bank of England rate cuts and 
broad increases in public spending over the course of 2020. 
Sitting behind the first set of measures is the idea that the temporary impact of 
coronavirus should not fundamentally change the long-term profitability of almost all 
individual firms, while the scale of interventions on the second (with rate cuts on just one 
tenth of the scale seen during the financial crisis) reflected a view about the length and 
depth of the shock to come. 
But it is now clear that this was far too optimistic, both with regards to the size of the 
shock but also its length. Crucially, it will not be the illness itself driving the bulk of the 
economic damage, but our response to it. The economic implications of (fully justified) 
steps to intensify social distancing, not least the move to close schools, are likely to far 
outweigh those from forced work absence due to sickness or self-isolation.1 
We are on course for job losses to be significant, with the initial sudden stop to economic 
activity being concentrated in the jobs-rich parts of our economy, like non-food retail 
and hospitality. Timely economic data from other European countries suggests that 
unemployment is already rising.2 Alongside the smaller effect from reduced earnings 
due to sickness or self-isolation, the resulting income shock to families (or even just 
the potential for such a shock given the uncertain outlook) will induce wider economic 
effects through reduced aggregate demand.3 
In that context, the Chancellor has recognised the challenge, promising to introduce 
measures focused on households, not just firms. Those cannot come quickly enough and 
what they should be is discussed in detail below. 
In all crises, the key objective is to address the root cause of the economic shock, 
providing certainty to firms and families that the problem will not persist. This is because 
the combination of an economic shock, along with huge uncertainty about how long 
the problem will last, is a recipe for a massive retrenchment in spending both from 
households and businesses. This will in turn drag down aggregate demand further, 
leading to an even deeper recession. But the danger is that this is exactly where we are 
today. The open-ended nature of our response to the health crisis makes the economic 
shock much harder to deal with. 
1 See, for example: HM Government, COVID-19: guidance on social distancing and for vulnerable people, March 2019.
2 Timely open data sources suggest that unemployment has doubled in Norway in the past week (up 128 per cent Tuesday-Tuesday), 
with transport, service and retail jobs most affected. Source: https://data.nav.no, accessed 17 March 2020.
3 For a similar discussion in relation to the US, see: A Dube, Filling the Holes in Family and Business Budgets: Unemployment 
Benefits and Work Sharing in the Time of Pandemics, March 2020.
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think about the task of designing the economic response. Most importantly, if we cannot 
reduce the actual uncertainty of how long social distancing and other important but 
economically damaging measures will last for, we need to make that uncertainty matter a 
lot less for firms and families.
So the Government’s focus must switch from offering cheap loans and generalised 
macroeconomic stimulus. While that approach will provide beneficial support to the 
economy, it doesn’t go far enough (in Box 1 we discuss how the existing loan scheme can 
be adapted to make it more effective). Instead, we need targeted measures that alleviate 
hardship, give firms the confidence to avoid laying off staff or shutting up shop, and give 
families the reassurance that their incomes will not fall far and stay low. 
BOX 1: Ensuring business loans support the economy effectively
The Government’s latest promise 
of up to £330 billion of guaranteed 
loans to struggling firms will provide 
a much-needed source of readily 
accessible funding (or liquidity) to 
support fundamentally solvent firms 
weather the economic consequences 
of measures to reduce the spread of 
coronavirus. A key point to recognise 
here is that such a loan scheme – even 
if the terms are very generous – will 
increase the costs faced by firms, and 
so will increase the risk that firms go 
out of business. 
So the terms under which these loans 
are offered will be crucial to how 
successfully they can provide support 
to businesses. While the details of 
the Government’s loan scheme are 
not yet known, it appears to favour 
relatively short-term credit, with 
interest payments due after six months. 
But there is considerable uncertainty 
about both the duration of the public 
health restrictions required to contain 
the virus, and about the impact those 
measures will have on businesses in the 
short to medium term. A typical small 
firm holds cash reserves equal to three 
months’ expenses, which could be 
quickly exhausted in the coming weeks. 
And once the health emergency has 
ended and restrictions are lifted, firms 
will need time to win back customers, 
replace laid-off workers, reconnect with 
suppliers, and rebuild order books. If 
travel and social distancing restrictions 
need to be in place for more than a few 
months, it may be several years before 
some viable firms are able to repay the 
principal on these loans. 
One way to deal with this problem is 
for the Government to accept a certain 
level of defaults within the scheme, and 
cover the costs through the guarantee. 
Under a similar scheme set up by the 
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Finance has already forecast a 20 per 
cent default rate on their small business 
loans.4 However, these defaults would 
have long-term consequences for the 
creditworthiness of the beneficiaries, 
and impair their access to other credit 
needed to recover.
To take account of the uncertainty 
about the duration and severity 
of the economic disruption in the 
coming months and avoid these loans 
becoming an additional burden on the 
economic recovery, the Government 
should consider adapting its scheme in 
three respects:
 • First, the maturity of the loan should 
be contingent on the lifting of public 
4  The Local, Denmark moves to protect economy from coronavirus impact, March 2020.
5 C Pacitti & J Smith, A problem shared? What can we learn from past recessions about the impact of the next across the income 
distribution?, Resolution Foundation, August 2019.
health restrictions such that the 
timetable for repayment of interest 
and principal only commences when 
it is clear the outbreak and associated 
disruption is over.
 • Second, repayment terms should be 
contingent on the pace of recovery in 
the firms’ earnings so that no firm is 
required to repay more than a certain 
proportion of its earnings in a given 
month or quarter.
 • Third, to prevent firms from using 
the loans to reduce costs by making 
people redundant, the Government 
should retain a share of the collateral 
of any firm that repays the loan while 
laying off workers.
In combating the demand shock, we must recognise that the income 
hit is likely to affect those with the least resources most
The UK is heading into a recession and history teaches us that they are very painful. The 
average fall in GDP in the UK is 4 per cent, equivalent to £2,500 per household, while the 
average increase in unemployment is 1 million. Given the scale of the sudden stop to 
some economic activity and the synchronised nature of the shock across the globe, it is 
almost certain that this is not an average recession. 
Crucially, and unlike 2008 when earnings took a bigger hit, the risk is that negative effects 
are concentrated on those with the least resources.5 The policy response must have this 
risk built into it, partly to reduce severe hardship for those affected but also to ensure it is 
effective at targeting the source of the demand shock we are most likely to see. 
As we’ve set out previously, the risk that negative effects in this crisis are concentrated 
on those with the least resources is the case in relation to support for workers off sick 
or self-isolating. The 2 million lowest-earning employees are ineligible for Statutory 
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employees). These groups instead rely on the benefits system in which awards fall below 
already-low SSP levels.6 And among SSP-eligible employees, lower earners are much 
less likely to have sick pay schemes that are more generous than the minimum statutory 
requirements.7
So too are the broader risks of reduced hours or lost jobs concentrated among the least 
well off. In the first instance, we can consider the sectors most at risk of seeing sharp 
reductions in revenue from the Government’s latest guidance to avoid all but essential 
travel and social contact. These include retail (excluding food), hotels and restaurants, 
airlines, travel operators, cleaning, arts and entertainment, and personal services like 
hairdressing. Britain is a service economy, so it’s no surprise that we’re talking about 
sectors that account for 19 per cent of employment (comprising 5 million employees 
and 1.2 million self-employed people) in the UK today. And they have a low-earning bias: 
typical weekly employee pay in these sectors was £320 in 2019, compared to £455 across 
employees as a whole.8
Another way of thinking about whose income is most at risk from social distancing 
measures, particularly given the recent decision to close schools (and acknowledging 
the difficulty of working from home with kids around), is asking who would be able to 
continue economic activity during that period? If we consider who can work from home 
on a regular basis, again the message is clear. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that whether 
viewed across the distribution of weekly pay, or through the lens of occupation and 
sector, being able to work from home is very much a higher-paid phenomenon. The 
implication is that as with the sectors most at risk from immediately reduced demand, 
broader reductions in the ability to be physically present at work put the hours and jobs 
of lower earners at threat the most.
6 K Handscomb, Coronavirus and the benefits system: What support is available?, Resolution Foundation, March 2020.
7 T Bell, L Gardiner, R Hughes, J Smith & T Yates, A Budget action plan: The economic response to the coronavirus, Resolution 
Foundation, March 2020.
8  Source: RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey.
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home if needed
Proportion of employees who can work from home if needed, by weekly pay vigintile: UK, 
2014-2018
NOTES: Pay vigintiles are calculated within each calendar year. Pay is usual gross weekly pay.
SOURCE: RF analysis of ISER, Understanding Society.
In particular, it’s clear from Figure 2 that workers in the bottom-five broad occupational 
groups are extremely unlikely to be able to work from home. These occupations account 
for 42 per cent of people in employment, or 31 per cent excluding those also in the 
sectors most at risk of reduced demand in the face of the latest health advice, listed 
above.
Finally, while those on lower incomes are likely to be more exposed to the risk of losing 
all or part of their pay, that group also lacks the financial buffers to smooth through 
such a period. It is important not just to consider individuals’ financial resilience from 
the perspective of earnings flows. The state of their balance sheets is crucial, too – 
both in terms of the ability of households to cope with income shocks without severe 
hardship, and to understand the extent to which demand may fall. While the good news 
is that outstanding debt levels have fallen over the past decade,9 we also have a greater 
proportion of lower-income families without savings.10
9 J Ahmed & K Henehan, An outstanding balance? Inequalities in the use – and burden – of consumer credit in the UK, Resolution 
Foundation, January 2020.
10 C Pacitti & J Smith, A problem shared? What can we learn from past recessions about the impact of the next across the income 
distribution?, Resolution Foundation, August 2019.
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FIGURE 2: Those in lower-paying industries and occupations are least likely to be 
able to work from home
Proportion of employees who can work from home if needed and gross weekly pay, by 
industry and occupation: UK, 2014-2018 / 2019 
NOTES: Work from home data is from waves 6 and 8 of Understanding Society. Pay data is from the 2019 quarters 
of the Labour Force Survey.
SOURCE: RF analysis of ISER, Understanding Society; ONS, Labour Force Survey.
 As families cope with hits to their incomes during a crisis, having debt you can roll over 
– or, in extreme, default on – is in fact an easier situation to deal with than not having 
savings that can be drawn down. Importantly, Figure 3 shows that those in the most 
at-risk sectors and occupations identified above are each around 25 per cent more 
likely than average to live in families with no savings at all to fall back on. So the groups 
most exposed to the direct income shock, with their lack of savings to fall back on to 
support their consumption, indicate a risk that the size of the aggregate demand shock 
is amplified. This is the context for designing a targeted policy response, and it is a very 
different one to previous shocks, including the financial crisis.
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FIGURE 3: Those at risk of reduced employment in the current crisis are more likely 
than average to have no savings
Proportion of 16-64-year-old working adults living in families with no savings: UK, 2017-18
NOTES: At risk sectors are defined slightly more broadly than above due to a more limited industry variable. They 
include retail, air transport, hotels and restaurants, motor vehicle hire, cleaning, arts and entertainment, and 
personal services.
SOURCE: RF analysis of DWP, Households Below Average Income.
This merits a three-part focus: 1. Boost sick pay
Periods of time off sick, hours reductions or job separations for the groups described 
above will lead to economic hardship, increase pressures on the benefit system, and 
risk having long-term scarring effects on the individuals concerned. This would bear 
down on current and future consumption and so make the shock worse. As a result, the 
Government needs to expand its policy response considerably. This expanded response 
should have three parts, focusing on: boosting sick pay itself, maintaining workers’ 
attachment to firms in the face of temporarily reduced demand, and a strengthening the 
social security safety net for those who fall out of employment.
The first of these has been the most discussed, but the key remaining actions for the 
Government bear repetition. Building on measures announced in the Budget last week to 
pay SSP from day one of absence and to those self-isolating but not ill, the Government 
should also extend SSP to the 2 million employees who earn less than £118 per week 
(£120 from April) and are thus ineligible. As suggested in a Government consultation last 
year, SSP could be paid at 80 per cent of earnings for those getting less than the full rate, 
to maintain incentives to (return to) work.11 Based on the assumption that 50 per cent 
of this group will take a full two weeks’ sick leave in the coming months as a result of 
11 Department for Work and Pensions/Department for Health and Social Care, Health is everyone’s business: proposals to reduce ill 
health-related job loss, July 2019.
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contracting coronavirus or self-isolating, this policy carries a cost of around £200 million, 
which the Government should support firms in meeting.12
In addition, SSP could be made more generous. Increasing it from £95.85 (from April 
onwards) to around £160 per week would lift SSP from less than one-third to around half 
the value of each of: the earnings of employees currently eligible for SSP only; full-time 
earnings on the National Living Wage; and the minimum income standard for a single 
working-age adult.13
Again based on the assumption that half of eligible employees take sick leave in the 
coming months, this policy change would increase SSP costs by £2 billion across firms, 
and by £800 million in small and medium-sized ones (SMEs, defined as those with fewer 
than 250 employees).14 The Government should reimburse firms, or at least SMEs, for 
this increase in sick pay costs. This would effectively entail an increase on the £2 billion 
committed to SSP rebates for small and medium-sized firms in last week’s Budget.
This merits a three-part focus: 2. Maintain workers’ attachment to 
firms in the face of reduced demand
Simply supporting incomes during periods of sickness-related absence themselves 
is only relevant to a small part of the economic shock we face. The broader reduction 
in economic activity means firms’ revenues falling and choices between going out of 
business or swiftly reducing costs – including wage bills. And workers without childcare 
working in industries where remote working is not possible will now face a difficult choice 
between caring for their children and quitting (or be fired from) their jobs while schools 
are closed. The result will be rising unemployment and shorter hours, the reality and 
fear of which will further deepen and prolong the downturn beyond the impact of social 
distancing itself. 
The huge uncertainty about how long these economic impacts will continue for also risks 
deepening the downturn via its effect on both firm and family behaviours. Firms facing 
what may feel like an indefinite reduction in revenue are much more likely to respond 
by laying off staff than those knowing it will only last a few months. In this context, the 
12 These costings are derived as follows. Based on earnings distributions in the ONS’s Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, we 
estimate that around 8 per cent of employees earn less than £120 per week, with mean pay of around £76 per week. We apply SSP 
at 80 per cent of earnings for this group, and assume that 50 per cent are in receipt for two weeks. The number of employees in the 
UK (27.8 million) is taken from the ONS’s latest Labour Market Statistics bulletin.
13 SSP-eligible employee earnings are estimated by adjusting median weekly earnings across employees according to the 
characteristics of employees eligible for SSP only, as opposed to more generous occupational sick pay schemes. See: Resolution 
Foundation, Spring Budget 2020 response, March 2020.
14 These costings are derived as follows. SSP is applied at £160 per week for all employees currently eligible for SSP (based on 
earnings distributions in the ONS’s Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings), and we assume that 50 per cent are in receipt for two 
weeks. The number of employees in the UK (27.8 million) is taken from the ONS’s latest Labour Market Statistics bulletin. We do not 
adjust these calculations for employees who have sick pay schemes above the statutory minimum (in other words, we capture the 
costs of the statutory element of these schemes). Our costing for small and medium-sized firms is calculated at 50 per cent of the 
total cost, based on BEIS’s Business Population Estimates for the private sector, adjusted for the proportion of employment in the 
public sector.
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Government’s strategy of providing bridging loans to firms, while beneficial, is unlikely 
to be sufficient. Similarly, families will cut back consumption more severely in the face 
of the reality or risk of an income hit if they have no idea how long it will last. This risks a 
much deeper downturn, and needs to be addressed with timely and substantial policy 
measures. 
The answer to these very significant challenges, apart from whenever possible providing 
the greatest possible clarity about the extent of measures to stop the spread of the virus, 
is to broaden the policy response beyond loans for firms, or sick pay for workers. Instead, 
swift action is needed to help struggling firms with their wage costs while simultaneously 
offering families reassurance that they will not face a long-lasting reduction in their 
incomes. Both objectives are best achieved in tandem with the introduction of a new 
Statutory Retention Pay (SRP) scheme in which people who do not have work to do stay 
formally employed by their firm, but with a significant amount of their pay covered by the 
Government. 
Such an approach also recognises the longer-term benefits of keeping workers out of 
unemployment and retaining matches between them and their fundamentally viable 
employers. A ‘middle way’ between short-term periods of strictly sickness-related 
absence in which the firm maintains the employment relationship – and full-blown lay-
offs – is highly desirable. As Box 2 sets out, such approaches have been implemented in 
recent days and weeks in many European countries.
BOX 2: Policies to support firms and workers in other countries
A range of policies have been put 
in place in other countries to shield 
households and businesses from the 
economic effects of the coronavirus 
outbreak. Below we set out the main 
features of the policy response in five 
European countries where major policy 
measures have been announced in 
recent days, that is: Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland and Sweden. In many 
cases, these policies are mutually 
reinforcing, with support for firms’ 
finances tending to reduce lay-offs 
and so also acting to help workers. 
A key takeaway from this analysis is 
that, as well as significant support for 
firms, all these countries have put in 
place significant measures to help 
workers remain attached to firms in 
the face of a temporary loss of revenue. 
The announced measures (alongside 
broader support from monetary and 
other fiscal policy) are summarised in 
Table 1.
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Denmark
The Danish Government has 
committed to reimburse firms for 
outlays on sick pay,15 extend 70 per cent 
guarantees for bank lending to firms 
that have experienced a drop of more 
than 50 per cent in their revenues as a 
result of coronavirus, and extending the 
period over which firms can make tax 
payments. Sick pay coverage has also 
been extended to apply from the first 
day an employee becomes ill or enters 
quarantine. Perhaps the most material 
response, however, is a scheme to pay 
75 per cent of the salary of workers who 
have been laid off temporarily (up to the 
equivalent of around £2,800 per month 
per employee). 
France
The French Government has taken 
a variety of measures to prevent 
bankruptcies. Most eye-catching is a 
plan to extend around €300 billion of 
loan guarantees through the banking 
sector. There have also been offers 
of forbearance on tax payments, a 
suspension of rent and utility payments 
for struggling small firms, and promises 
to recapitalise or nationalise key 
businesses if necessary. On top of 
these policies, €8.5 billion has been 
earmarked to provide two months of 
state support for temporarily laid-off 
workers. The payment level is currently 
15 For more information, see the Danish government website: stat.dk, Business Help Package – Questions and Answers, March 2020.
16 These benefits are available if at least 10 per cent of workers have lost at least 10 per cent of their income. Existing temporary 
workers are allowed to claim short-time allowance. Application processes will also be streamlined and achieved faster.
unspecified but will be higher than 
existing unemployment support.
Germany
The German Government has 
announced a new lending programme 
for businesses, provided through its 
state-owned bank KfW, with the terms 
of the loans adjusted to shift more 
risk onto the Government. Future 
increases in funding will be granted to 
ensure “unlimited” liquidity is available. 
In addition, tax relief will be provided 
for companies. The Government 
has also announced plans to fully 
reimburse social contributions for 
retained workers on shorter hours. 
And after being required to enter 
quarantine, employees must continue 
to be paid for six weeks (refunded by 
the Government). Short-time work 
allowance has been a long-standing 
policy in Germany, compensating 
workers for taking a cut in hours. This 
benefit applies to cuts in hours due to 
coronavirus and is paid at 67 per cent 
of the net wage difference (i.e. if an 
employee’s pay falls by €100 because 
of lost hours, the Government will pay 
the employee €67) for employees with 
children, and 60 per cent for those 
without children.16 
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TABLE 1: A range of monetary and fiscal policy measures have announced following 
the outbreak of coronavirus
Responses to the coronavirus outbreak, various countries
Monetary Policy Fiscal Policy
Total stimulus (excl. 
effect of rate cuts)
Rate 
cuts
Liquidity support for 
financial sector
Lending 
for firms
Sick pay
Temporary support for 
workers
Cash 
support
Cash support 
and loans
UK -50bp
Launch of new Term Funding 
Scheme for SMEs (c. £100bn) 
and Covid Corporate Financing 
Facility; macroprudential 
loosening
Yes
(£330bn)
Statutory Sick 
Pay, ESA and UC 
reforms
Mortgage forbearance, 
evicition protection for 
renters; Local Authority 
Hardship Fund
1.4% 16.2%
Ireland No Yes
Reforms to sick 
pay, including for 
the self-employed
0.8% Not costed
France No
ECB market liquidity 
operations
Yes 
(£270bn)
Partial unemployment 
benefit for temporarily 
laid off workers; no 
penalties on late 
payment of local taxes
1.8% 13.7%
Germany No
ECB market liquidity 
operations
Yes 
(up to 
£510bn)
Full wages during 
first six weeks for 
those in quarantine
Payments to workers 
facing shorter hours
Not costed 15.2%
Sweden No
£25bn purchases 
of securities; 
macroprudential 
loosening
Yes
Payments from 
first day of illness, 
Government 
covering all costs 
to May, including 
for the self-
employed
Short-term lay-offs 
scheme
5.8% 15.6%
Denmark No
£24bn in liquidity; 
macroprudential 
loosening
Yes
Payments from 
first day of illness, 
Government 
covering costs
Temporary pay 
compensation 
scheme
0.2% 0.5%
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Ireland
A variety of lending schemes have been 
announced by the Irish Government, 
including: a scheme to provide €200 
million in working capital loans – with 
up to €1.5 million available at reduced 
rates to individual firms; €200m for 
restructuring vulnerable but viable 
firms; and an increase in the size of 
loans available from MicroFinance 
Ireland. Meanwhile, all workers losing 
their jobs as a result of coronavirus 
are eligible to receive payments of 
€203 per week. Employers who have to 
temporarily shut businesses have been 
asked to continue paying staff €203 per 
week, reimbursed by the Government. 
Sick pay will rise to €305 per week and 
will also be available for those asked 
to self-isolate.17 And there is support 
for short-time working, with previously 
full-time employees eligible to receive a 
proportion of unemployment benefits. 
17 Additional emergency support is available for workers whose firms do not pay above the minimum state level.
Sweden 
The Swedish Government has put in 
place measures to allow the deferral 
of payment of employers’ social 
security contributions, preliminary 
tax on salaries and VAT. In addition, 
the Swedish Riksbank is set to take 
steps to increase the flow of credit to 
businesses through commercial banks. 
On sick pay, like the UK and Ireland, 
workers in Sweden are now eligible for 
payments from the first day of illness, 
with the Government to cover the 
cost to firms of all sick pay at least 
up to May. The benefit has also been 
extended to self-employed workers. 
Quarantined workers receive support 
worth 80 per cent of their salary from 
the Government while they are absent 
from work. Finally, the Government 
has introduced a ‘short-term lay-offs’ 
scheme, under which employers can 
halve their wage costs, and temporarily 
stand down their employees, who would 
still receive more than 90 per cent of 
their wage from the Government.
Could the UK do something similar to the worker-retention focused schemes in other 
countries? A key test for any policy being proposed in the face of the current outbreak 
is the ease and pace with which it can be delivered within existing mechanisms. Many 
European countries have extensive systems for employer-provided social insurance, 
so can perhaps arrive at the approaches set out in Box 2 more quickly than we would 
be able to in the UK. In short, we need to work with what we’ve got given the pace with 
which the economic shock is developing. Our view is that the best avenue to build on for 
a worker-retention scheme is the approach we currently take to Statutory Maternity Pay 
(SMP).
Doing what it takes | Protecting firms and families from the economic impact of coronavirus
Resolution Foundation
17
SMP is paid for up to 39 weeks, initially at a proportion of earnings and then at a flat rate 
(£151.20 per week from April 2020). Employers can reclaim the majority of payments from 
the Government (92 per cent, or over 100 per cent for very small firms) and apply for an 
advance if they cannot meet the costs up front. 
Mimicking this scheme, we suggest temporary ‘Statutory Retention Pay’ (SRP) is 
introduced for employees (other than those off sick or isolating) not delivering any 
work due to coronavirus measures (including the need to care for children who are off 
school), and who the firm intends to keep employing beyond the SRP period (with the 
Government able to recoup support from firms that in fact let staff go but remain viable 
themselves). Unlike the Irish scheme, SRP could be used in firms that aren’t temporarily 
closing entirely (i.e. they are reducing their workforces rather than temporarily side-lining 
everyone), with the explicit intention that it is one of the mechanisms businesses can 
use to stay open and maintain some economic activity. 
While the swift operationalisation on the basis of an existing scheme means SRP could 
not be easily applied to the self-employed, policy makers should look to extend it to this 
group where possible. While that is unlikely to be possible for most self-employed people, 
it may be possible to do for large firms that operate entire self-employed workforces, 
particularly in the transport sector.
SRP could be paid at a flat rate equivalent to SMP – £151.20 per week – to everyone 
earning at least 25 per cent more than this amount (and at 80 per cent of earnings below 
that). This flat-rate approach would be targeted at relieving firms’ costs and ensuring 
workers do not end up in severe need. However, given the policy priority of avoiding a 
deep shock to demand, we should go further and offer more reassurance on income 
protection for workers. To achieve this, SRP payments could be linked to earnings, in line 
with many of the non-Irish European examples in Box 2. One option would be for SRP to 
be paid as a percentage of the workers’ previous typical earnings18 above the minimum 
amounts set out for the flat rate scheme above. We suggest a rate of around two-thirds, 
subject to a cap at high earnings. The costs of SRP itself would be reclaimed from the 
government, and as with SMP, firms that are in a position to do so would top up SRP to 
nearer 100 per cent of the typical wage.
The lower replacement rate of the SRP scheme we propose than in the French approach 
is an explicit exchange for a longer payment period – we suggest paying SRP for up 
to six months initially. We think this is important given the unknown extent of the 
crisis and the need for cost and income certainty for firms and families, respectively. 
Finally, while the hours reduction approach in Germany has much to recommend it, 
we haven’t suggested something similar for the UK given the logistical challenges of 
18  As in SMP, typical earnings could be calculated based on pay over the eight weeks prior to coronavirus impacts.
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setting up the necessary systems swiftly (in comparison, Germany has a long history of 
hours-reduction mechanisms). For families on low incomes, Universal Credit will offer 
relatively swift compensation for reductions in working hours. For tax credits recipients, 
the Government should immediately make adjustments to tax credits to return to the 
pre-2012 approach of not having a threshold for how much someone’s income must fall 
before their tax credits start to rise to compensate. 
Figure 4 sets out indicative estimates of the costs of the SRP scheme we propose, based 
on two scenarios for the number of employees moving onto it: 500,000 and 1 million 
(chosen with reference to the roughly 1 million increase in unemployment during and 
after the financial crisis). These costs take account of certain employees (those in the 
most at-risk sectors from the health response and those in lower-skilled occupations) 
being more likely to move onto the scheme. Based on a caseload of 1 million our 
estimates suggest the flat-rate scheme would cost the Government around £3.6 billion, 
while the proposed earnings-linked SRP scheme would come in at £8 billion.
FIGURE 4: Statutory Retention Pay could cost up to £8 billion over six months
Estimated costs of a Statutory Retention Pay scheme over six months: UK, 2020-21
NOTES: The flat-rate scheme provides a weekly payment of £151.20 (equal to Statutory Maternity Pay in 2020-21) 
to every retained employee with gross weekly pay above £189, and a payment of 80 per cent of each individual’s 
gross weekly pay to those earning below £189 each week. The earnings-linked scheme provides a weekly 
payment of two-thirds of an individual’s gross weekly pay to every retained employee earning above £189, and a 
payment of 80 per cent of each individual’s gross weekly pay to those earning below £189 each week. The total 
size of population shown is broadly in line with the increase in unemployment that took place following the 
financial crisis (1.09 million), and we also present costs for an unemployment rise of around half this amount. The 
composition of the population is determined such that those in the most ‘at risk’ sectors (set out above) are four 
times as likely to use the scheme as those at low risk (all other employees), and those at medium risk (anyone 
else in the five lowest-skilled occupational groups) are twice as likely to use the scheme as the low-risk group. 
We assume that some low-risk employees will need support not because of the direct impact of the public 
health response, but because of the broader hit to demand that it causes. Costed using 2019 figures for gross 
weekly pay and reweighting of populations to match assumed totals (of 500,000 and 1,000,000).
SOURCE: RF analysis of ONS, Labour Force Survey.
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Introducing such a scheme would not be straightforward, but it appears feasible within 
existing structures. It could be delivered through existing payroll systems so that workers 
would still be paid when and how they are used to being paid. The Government would 
need to ramp up capacity but has established mechanisms for rebating (or paying 
up front) the costs of SMP to firms. Operating via firms’ payroll systems and existing 
mechanisms is significantly preferable in terms of speed and targeting to proposals being 
made, particularly in the US or among long-standing universal basic income advocates, 
to send flat-rate payments to all households. Given the benefits of maintaining existing 
links between firms and workers, preventing lasting rises in unemployment and reducing 
firms costs swiftly, making such a scheme a reality is not only highly desirable but urgent.
This merits a three-part focus: 3. Strengthen the social security 
safety net
The proposal to introduce SRP would make a material difference to the number of 
families facing severe income shocks, to firms’ costs, and to the depth of the demand 
shock facing our economy. But unemployment will still increase. Even if the two 
approaches discussed above are followed to full effect, there are individuals and firms 
that they will not work for, not least 5 million self-employed people (a group that has 
grown over the 21st century). So, to provide further protection from income shocks to 
those lower-income families least likely to have savings or other resources to fall back on, 
the third priority for the Government is to strengthen the social security safety net.
Unfortunately, we do not start in a good place. Recent years of working-age benefit 
freezes and below-earnings uprating before that have left the main rate of unemployment 
benefit lower than in the early 1990s, despite the economy growing by amore than 75 per 
cent in that period, as Figure 5 shows.19
These changes to unemployment support have run alongside broader reductions in 
recent years to working-age benefit entitlement and generosity. While in normal times 
this is a problem for the families concerned, and anyone worried about current increases 
in child poverty, it is now a macroeconomic problem too. The result of these cuts is 
that the economy’s ‘automatic stabilisers’ – the extent to which incomes, and therefore 
consumption, are maintained in the face of a shock – have been somewhat weakened 
over the past decade. For example, in a simulated recession like that of 2008-09, net 
household incomes in the second quartile of the income distribution would fall today by 
4.5 per cent. 
19 A Corlett, The benefit freeze has ended, but erosion of the social security safety net continues: Expected benefit uprating in April 
2020, Resolution Foundation, October 2019.
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FIGURE 5: Unemployment benefits have been in continual decline relative to 
earnings
The value of the main rate of unemployment-related benefit over time
NOTES: Full-time earnings on the minimum wage calculated based on a 40-hour week.
SOURCE: RF analysis of IFS, Fiscal Facts; ONS; Bank of England.
Had no tax and benefit policy changes been rolled out since 2010, however, that same 
shock would deliver a smaller income decline in the second quartile, of 4.1 per cent.20 
Or for a specific example, consider that a full-time median earner in a couple with two 
children would maintain 59 per cent of their income if falling out of work today, compared 
to 66 per cent absent the welfare cuts of the past decade.21
The crisis has intensified calls for some form of universal basic income system to be set 
up, or for cash payments to be made to all individuals or households. Such a response 
would be a lot more expensive, less well targeted, provide a less powerful boost to 
aggregate demand and, more importantly, take far too long to introduce when families 
need support immediately. We should therefore focus attention on the tools we have 
available now. 
In the first instance, the priority should be to raise the main adult rate of unemployment 
benefit in Universal Credit (UC) and Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support 
Allowance by one-third, to £100 per week in April 2020 (with equivalent increases to 
20 For a discussion of changes to the UK’s system of ‘automatic stabilisers’, see: J Smith, J Leslie, C Pacitti, & F Rahman, Recession 
Ready?: Assessing the UK’s macroeconomic outlook, Resolution Foundation, September 2019.
21 We assume that this family owns their own home, and that the second earner (who does not fall out of work) earns at the 25th 
percentile of hourly wages and works 20 hours per week.
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under-25-year-old and couples’ rates). The usual arguments against doing so rest on the 
idea that it will discourage work, but that is of no relevance during a crisis of this sort.22
Beyond that, the Government could target a 10 per cent uprating of other elements of 
the means-tested benefit system (UC and tax credits) in April 2020.23 As Figure 6 shows, 
this package comes at a cost of around £13 billion annually, with the majority of that cost 
(£10 billion) deriving from the increase in the main rate of out-of-work support.
Figure 6 also shows costings in a higher unemployment scenario (based on the 
unemployment rate coming close to doubling). This pushes up costs, but the 
difference between the gold bar and the other bars on the right-hand side of the chart 
demonstrates that this is mainly driven by higher claimant numbers as a result of higher 
unemployment, rather than the policy change itself.
FIGURE 6: Increasing the main adult rate of out-of-work support to £100 per week 
would cost £10 billion annually
Additional costs of means-tested benefit uprating policies, 2020-21
NOTES: Assumes partial roll-out of UC, and accounts for benefit take-up. The higher unemployment scenario is 
based on the unemployment rate almost doubling from the 4.3 per cent average across 2017-18. In the second 
and third scenarios, young adult and couple rates of out-of-work support are increased by the same proportion 
as the main adult rate. In the third scenario, other elements of tax credits, Housing Benefit and UC are uprated 
by 10 per cent.
SOURCE: RF analysis using the IPPR tax-benefit model.
22 The effects of such a move would be limited to out-of-work support in the legacy benefits (tax credits) system, but, because of the 
single calculation that includes a standard allowance across those in and out of work, would also boost incomes for the minority of 
in-work benefit recipients already on UC. This pushes up costs, but maintains work incentives as a result.
23 We do not suggest uprating Child Benefit or disability cost benefits. Such measures may be desirable, but are less relevant to the 
current crisis.
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The costs set out here are higher than those for SRP above, despite the weekly payment 
being lower. This is because more people are affected and elevated unemployment 
is likely to last for longer than the need for SRP, based on the experience of previous 
recessions. That is why we provide a costing for the full-year impact of these policy 
changes (as opposed to our SRP costing of six months, initially). A further consideration 
is the extent to which the SRP scheme and our benefit policy costings interact. The 
costings set out in this briefing note are not fully integrated, but a high-take-up SRP 
scheme would be expected to reduce pressures on the social security system. This would 
perhaps push gross costs towards the left-hand side of those set out in Figure 6.
This approach to increasing means-tested benefits would have a material impact on the 
level of the safety net provided to families turning to the benefits system in the face of 
coronavirus-related income falls. For example, the median earner in a couple with kids, 
mentioned above, would benefit from a higher replacement rate when falling out of work 
– rising from 59 per cent to 62 per cent.
Beyond this fundamental increase in the generosity of support, there is more that the 
Government should do to ensure that the social security safety net is fit for the current 
challenge.
First, there are other changes to be made to UC. The minimum income floor (MIF) 
that applies to the self-employed will need to be suspended. The MIF means that, 
when assessing the circumstances of the self-employed, UC assumes that self-those 
people whose business has been operating for more than a year earn an amount at 
least equivalent to 35 hours of work per week at the National Living Wage (NLW). This 
rule is intended both to prevent fraud and to reduce the extent to which UC subsidises 
unprofitable instances of self-employment. But it is wholly inappropriate during the 
current crisis, when there is a clear need to allow what were viable instances of self-
employment to survive. The 2020 Spring Budget relaxed this rule for “those who have 
COVID-19 or are self-isolating according to government advice”. This does not go far 
enough: it means that someone whose business has collapsed because of the fall in 
demand would still be treated as if they were earning the NLW. We therefore recommend 
that the MIF be scrapped for all self-employed UC claimants for the duration of the 
economic crisis. 
One of the most controversial features about Universal Credit is the five-week wait from 
making the claim to receiving the first payment. This feature is baked into the design, 
operation and crucially the IT systems that lie behind UC payments. It cannot be changed 
on a timeline relevant to this crisis, so those worried about the speed of payments 
to households should focus elsewhere. The Government’s solution to the five-week 
wait is advance payments. These mean that people receive some of their first month’s 
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entitlement in advance, which is then repaid out of future UC payments over 12 months 
(the 2020 Spring Budget confirmed that repayments could be made over 24 months, but 
only from October 2021). Given where we are today, the best way to ensure people take 
advance payments to support their living standards immediately is to provide them as 
a matter of course and specify that repayments will not be taken for the first six months 
of a claim, or for the duration of the crisis. This will involve accepting a higher risk of bad 
debts within the benefits system.
As mentioned above, a related change, also intended to make sure that the safety net 
responds quickly to families’ greater needs, involves adjusting tax credits to return to the 
pre-2012 approach of not having a threshold for how much someone’s income must fall 
before their tax credits start to rise to compensate.
During the next few months when the economic impacts of the virus are most severe, 
hard job-search requirements make less sense, and neither will Jobcentre Plus have the 
capacity to enforce them properly as the priority switches to processing new claims. We 
therefore recommend that the existing system of conditionality within UC and legacy 
benefits, and the application of sanctions, are pared back to the absolute minimum 
during the immediate period of the crisis. In practical terms this will also simplify 
judgements that Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) staff will otherwise have to 
make about who is excused from conditionality, or not subject to sanctions because of 
self-isolation or the need to care for dependants. 
Second, an additional part of the UK’s safety net is provided by local authorities, in the 
form of Council Tax Support (CTS), which offsets some or all of the costs of Council Tax 
for low-income families.24 In the Budget, the Chancellor provided an additional £500 
million for local authorities to use to support low-income households, in particular with 
Council Tax bills. This is a good approach, recognising that Council Tax is a significant 
cost for many, and that there is value in having some funds administered locally with 
more discretion to support need as they find it than a national benefits system can ever 
provide. However, as with many of the measures announced only a week ago, the level 
of support is too small. In practice it is likely to mainly help councils deal with increased 
claimant numbers as a result of the crisis, rather than actually improve the generosity of 
schemes.
The support announced in the Budget is much less than the amount by which local 
authorities have scaled back CTS compared to the pre-2013 system of Council Tax Benefit 
(cuts since 2013 by English local authorities are estimated by the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies to mean that £706 million a year less is being paid out).25 With Council Tax bills 
24 CTS schemes are set by English local authorities, and by the Welsh and Scottish governments. CTS does not apply in Northern 
Ireland.
25 S Adam, R Joyce & T Pope, The impacts of localised council tax support schemes, Institute for Fiscal Studies, January 2019.
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for the new financial year landing on people’s doormats soon, and with an estimated 1.4 
million households being liable to pay Council Tax who would have received a full rebate 
under the pre-2013 system, we recommend that the Chancellor substantially increases 
the local authority support fund. 
Third, in terms of support for housing, the only way that the Government has said it will 
provide direct support to home owners in the social security system is through a scheme 
called Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI). This provides a top-up loan to Universal 
Credit or Pension Credit to cover interest on up to £200,000 of a mortgage. UC recipients 
have to wait for nine months before receiving SMI. We recommend that these waiting 
periods be abolished. 
On 17 March, the Government announced that mortgage lenders have agreed they 
will support customers who are experiencing issues with their finances as a result of 
coronavirus, including through payment holidays of up to three months with no impact 
on their credit rating. If further measures are deemed necessary to support home owners, 
then the Government and the Bank of England could revisit some of the schemes 
implemented after the 2008 financial crisis. However, as interest rates are already so low, 
it seems unlikely that the coronavirus will have as much of an impact on home owners as 
even the, much smaller than expected at the time, effects felt in 2008. Private renters, on 
the other hand, will be more exposed, especially given the cuts to housing support since 
2011 and the fact that many lack their own resources to fall back on. The appropriate 
policy response on housing is discussed in Box 3.
BOX 3: The response of housing policy to coronavirus
Housing costs are the largest single 
outgoing for most families, and one 
that it is very difficult to adjust in the 
short term to an income shock. Given 
this, the Chancellor’s announcement 
on Tuesday that many mortgagors 
would be offered a three-month 
mortgage holiday in the event that 
they experience financial stress was 
welcome. However, home owners are 
in general well-placed to manage their 
housing-cost burden over the coming 
months: they tend to have both higher 
income and higher wealth than those 
in other tenures, and have seen their 
housing costs fall considerably in 
recent years as a result of low interest 
rates (Figure 7). 
So, what should be done right now to 
help those who do not own their own 
property? The response should involve 
balancing the interests of tenants, 
landlords (both public and private) and 
the Government. It is very welcome that 
the government acted on 18 March to 
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ban new evictions during the course 
of this crisis. The interests of buy-to-let 
landlords were protected by extending 
26 D Tomlinson, Inequality street: Housing and the 2019 general election, Resolution Foundation November 2019.
the coverage of the mortgage holiday 
noted above to them. 
FIGURE 7: Mortgage interest payments have fallen in recent years
Average housing cost to income ratio by tenure, net of Housing Benefit: UK
NOTES: Housing costs are calculated net of Housing Benefit such that Housing Benefit is excluded from 
both income and housing costs. Income is net income after Housing Benefit is deducted. Data is for Great 
Britain only between 1994 and 2001. Year refers to main year in fiscal year e.g. 2017 = 2017-18.
SOURCE: RF analysis of DWP, Households Below Average Income.
But ultimately rents will need to be 
paid, and for lower-income families the 
only way to protect both tenants and 
landlords is for the benefits system 
to take the strain. As has often been 
noted (not least, by us), the generosity 
of housing support provided by the 
state has declined significantly in 
recent years (see Figure 8), alongside 
the proportion of families who have 
the totality of their rent covered by 
a benefit.26 Putting value back into 
housing support will be essential if 
renters are to be protected in the 
coming months, as will be simplifying 
the new claims process for those who 
are not currently in receipt of any 
housing support. 
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FIGURE 8: Housing Benefit generosity has declined over time
Average share of housing costs covered by Housing Benefit for those receiving Housing 
Benefit, by tenure: GB
NOTES: Year refers to main year in fiscal year e.g. 2017 = 2017-18.
SOURCE: RF analysis of DWP, Households Below Average Income.
Finally, it is crucial that the DWP is adequately resourced to deal with the additional 
demand on its staff and systems. In the Budget, the Chancellor established a £5 
billion coronavirus response fund to “ensure that funding is available so that [all public 
services] are prepared and protected”. We recommend that DWP be allowed to access 
this fund so that it can cope with the imminent increase in claims for UC and other 
benefits. Experience tells us that the process of quickly ramping up new claims is a 
major challenge for Jobcentre Plus, this time complicated by the fact that staff will 
be coping with sickness and home-working themselves. To reduce that pressure, we 
also recommend allowing everyone to claim UC without having to immediately attend 
an appointment (not just if they have been advised to self-isolate, as announced in 
the Budget). This will ease the burden on DWP staff, as well as reducing the risk of 
transmitting the virus through face-to-face interaction. 
Conclusion
Taken together, the three-part package set out in this briefing note would amount to a 
bold response to a very serious economic crisis. It would target the core problems that 
the nature of this shock is posing to individual firms, families and the economy as a 
whole. And crucially, it rests on measures that are not always easy but which can actually 
be taken, and taken swiftly. Now is the time to act.
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